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WASHINGTON
Kettle Range Conservation Group v. Washington Dep't of Natural
Res., No. 29077-4-, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 3053 (Wash. Ct. App.
Dec. 23, 2003) (holding that evidence of erroneous data and
calculations regarding road plans and sedimentation prescriptions
contained in a watershed analysis is insufficient for watershed analysis
approval for a logging operation and may cause more sediment to
reach watershed waterways than the amount allowable under the
Washington Forest Practices Act).
The Kettle Range Conservation Group and the Lands Council
(collectively, "Kettle Range") initiated a regulatory compliance action
before the Washington Forest Practices Appeals Board ("Board")
against Stinison Lumber Company ("Stimson"). Seeking summary
judgment, Kettle Range argued that the Washington Department of
Natural Resources ("DNR") acted contrary to the requirements of the
State Environmental Protection Act ("SEPA") when it issued a
modified determination of nonsignificance ("MDNS") to Stimson
based in part on a faulty watershed analysis. Kettle Range claimed that
the watershed analysis did not comply with Washington Forest
Practices Rules because it did not adequately address the adverse
environmental impacts of Stimson's proposed logging project.
Specifically, Kettle Range alleged that Stimson should not have
received forest practice permits, which allowed the company to harvest
timber in the watershed, because Stimson did not first submit a full
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") for the project. Kettle Range
argued for recission of Stimson's forest practice permits and moved for
an emergency stay, followed by a motion for a preliminary stay.
Stimson and the DNR moved for partial summary judgment,
asserting that the Stimson watershed analysis was sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of the Forest Practices Act. The Board granted
Stimson's and the DNR's motions for summary judgment, denied all
Kettle Range motions, and ruled for Stimson and the DNR on multiple
remaining issues.
Subsequently, Kettle Range sought judicial review under the
Washington State Administrative Procedure Act. The Superior Court
of Thurston County, Washington granted review and affirmed the
Board's decision in favor of the DNR and Stimson. Kettle Range then
appealed to the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two. The
court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and held there was
"substantial evidence to support the Board's determination that the
DNR adequately considered Stimson's future forest practices."
However, the court agreed with Kettle Range that because parts of the
watershed analysis were "based on significant erroneous data and
calculations," the court could not conclude that the watershed analysis
would "cure adverse impacts of Stimson's proposal on the
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environment or comply with Forest Practice Rules."
On appeal, Kettle Range argued that the Board erroneously found
that it lacked authority to adjudicate a claim that the DNR acted
contrary to federal and state clean water legislation. However, the
court of appeals interpreted this argument as directly challenging the
water quality standards developed by the Forest Practices Board and
Ecology, and agreed that the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear the
claim. Affirming the Board, the court of appeals explained that Kettle
Range failed to file a petition for declaratory judgment in the superior
court, as required to challenge administrate rules.
Next, Kettle Range argued that the Board erred in finding that the
DNR adequately evaluated the effects of Stimson's future forest
practices in issuing the MDNS. Specifically, Kettle Range claimed that
the DNR decision failed to address protection of the native grizzly bear
and its habitat and, therefore, the DNR should have required a
project-specific EIS. However, the court of appeals again disagreed,
finding that the DNR was entitled to rely on both an EIS previously
prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Protection Act and
a Conservation Agreement ("CA") entered into by Stimson. The court
held the EIS and CA appropriately addressed problematic issues as
required, including land specific plans to mitigate negative effects on
the grizzly bear, even if the logging activities in question were not part
of the particular logging project described in the prior EIS and CA.
Additionally, Kettle Range argued that the watershed analysis
completed by Stimson and approved by the DNR contained
inadequate and incorrect soil erosion prescriptions, contrary to
Washington law.
The DNR responded that the prescriptions
contained in the watershed analysis were an improvement over
previous methods, regardless of the practices proposed at the time.
The court of appeals, however, agreed with Kettle Range on this point
and held that though Stimson provided a higher level of
environmental protection than exercised in the past, the "legal
requirement that the prescriptions must meet minimum protective
standards" was not met. In support of this conclusion, the court of
appeals pointed to evidence that Stimson based soil erosion
prescriptions on omitted roads in the road plan and false sedimentdelivery-level calculations, which would likely cause unwarranted
damage to the watershed. Ironically, the court of appeals pointed out,
the purpose of the erosion prescriptions was to prevent such watershed
damage.
Finally, the court of appeals rejected Kettle Range's request for
attorney's fees because of its ruling that the DNR was "substantially
justified in approving the watershed analysis." The court of appeals
affirmed in part and reversed and remanded to the DNR.
Furthermore, the court of appeals required Stimson to correct the
sedimentation calculations, watershed analysis prescriptions, and road
plan be corrected. After Stimson made the corrections, the court of
appeals ordered the DNR to determine if the revised watershed
analysis and road plan complied with the Washington Forest Practices
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Rules for watershed analysis approval.
Bnan M. Forbush
O'Hagan v. State, No. 28897-4-, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 2928 (Wash.
Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2003) (holding (1) agency properly determined
property was wedand, (2) restrictions in conditional water permit were
valid, and (3) landowner failed to show that wetland restrictions
deprived property of all economic value).
Patrick O'Hagan sued the Washington State Department of
Ecology ("DOE"), challenging its decision to impose six conditions on
a permit the DOE issued to O'Hagan in accordance with section 401
of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). O'Hagan sought to log and convert
three acres of his property, known as Bog 33, into a cranberry bog.
The United States Army Corps of Engineers classified Bog 33 as
forested wetland. Based on the wetland classification, section 401 of
the CWA required O'Hagan to obtain a permit prior to dredging or
filling his wetlands. The DOE granted O'Hagan a conditional permit,
imposing six conditions on the permit intended to mitigate wetland
loss. O'Hagan appealed all six conditions. The Superior Court of
Pacific County affirmed the DOE conditions, and O'Hagan appealed
the trial court's decision to the Washington Court of Appeals.
On appeal, O'Hagan challenged the DOE finding that Bog 33
constituted "wetlands," and further challenged the DOE's authority to
impose conditions on wetlands. O'Hagan argued that the Pollution
Control Hearings Board ("PCBH") finding that conversion of Bog 33
could adversely affect wildlife was arbitrary, and thus, the DOE had no
authority to impose conditions. Alternatively, O'Hagan argued the
DOE action constituted a regulatory taking without compensation, and
that the DOE waived the permitting requirement by failing to issue the
permit within one year of O'Hagan's application.
The court dismissed all of O'Hagan's claims. First, the court noted
that the Washington legislature authorized the DOE to take all
necessary action to comply with the CWA, and held the DOE's grant of
a conditional permit was not an abuse of agency authority. Second,
the court rejected O'Hagan's claim that the DOE action constituted a
taking. The court also held that a regulatory taking may occur where
the regulation does not support a legitimate state interest and denies
the property owner "all economically viable use of the property."
Applying this standard, the court held that O'Hagan's potential lost
profits from cranberry production did not constitute deprivation of all
economic uses of his land. The court then dismissed as moot
O'Hagan's claim that the PCHB's upholding of the DOE conditions
was arbitrary and capricious and violated O'Hagan's due process rights
because the permit and its conditions expired in 2000. Therefore,
because the court could provide no relief for O'Hagan's claims, the
court dismissed them as moot.
Holly Shook

